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ABSTRACT 
Taxation and Presidential Approval: Separate Effects from Tax Burden 
and Tax Structure Turbulence  
by Benny Geys and Jan Vermeir 
Previous research has established that taxation may entail significant electoral 
costs to politicians. This literature, however, focuses exclusively on the effect of 
the tax burden. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that both the level of the 
tax burden and the change in the tax structure affect the US president’s 
approval ratings (over the period 1959-2006). Our results support this proposi-
tion. Specifically, we find a negative impact from the levels of the tax burden 
and the deficit as well as from changes in the tax structure on presidential 
approval ratings. 
 




Besteuerung und Popularität von Politikern: Gibt es unterscheidbare 
Wirkungen aufgrund der Steuerlast und aufgrund von Veränderungen der 
Steuerstruktur?    
Bisherige Untersuchungen haben gezeigt, dass Besteuerung mit erheblichen 
Kosten für Politiker bei Wahlen einhergeht. Die entsprechende Literatur 
fokussiert allerdings ausschließlich den Effekt der Steuerbelastung. Im vor-
liegenden Artikel testen wir die Hypothese, dass sowohl das Niveau der Steuer-
belastung als auch Veränderungen der Steuerstruktur den Grad der Zustim-
mung für den US-Präsidenten beeinflussen (im Zeitraum 1959-2006). Die 
empirischen Ergebnisse stützen diese Behauptung. Es wird gezeigt, dass 
neben dem Defizit sowohl das Niveau der Steuerbelastung als auch Änderun-
gen in der Steuerstruktur negative Auswirkungen auf den Zustimmungsgrad für 
den Präsidenten haben.    1
1. Introduction 
 
Taxation – and, more generally, revenue generation – by the government is necessary 
for the provision of public goods.  Still, although we like to benefit from publicly 
provided goods, none of us enjoys paying the taxes to finance them.  Politicians are 
also likely to have an ambiguous relation with taxation.  They might well support 
extra revenues as it helps them to achieve their aims (be those providing public goods 
or rent-seeking), but generally shun the political costs inherently associated with these 
revenues.  The existence of such political costs of taxation has been analysed through 
vote and popularity functions (VP-functions).  This literature generally supports the 
idea that increases in tax revenues have a negative effect on a politician’s popularity 
and re-election odds (e.g. Niskanen, 1979; Besley and Case, 1995). 
 
While identifying taxation as an important determinant of election outcomes and 
approval ratings, the literature on VP-functions disregards the possible effects of tax 
structure reforms.  Nonetheless, in his seminal work on the politics of taxation, Rose 
(1985) argues that the popularity and re-election odds of incumbents are maximised, 
ceteris paribus, under a stable and unchanging tax system (see also Rose and Karran, 
1987).  The underlying argument is that tax changes have non-negligible fixed costs, 
irrespective of whether taxes are increased or lowered.  These costs arise because the 
political rewards from those who benefit from tax structure changes are likely to be 
lower than the electoral punishment by those who lose in the reform.  Indeed, 
individuals generally dislike losses more than they appreciate gains (cfr. the grievance 
asymmetry, Mueller, 1970).  Also, when tax reform takes place the electorate’s   2
attention is drawn to the least popular side of the government, i.e. the (high) tax 
burden (Peters, 1991). 
 
Ashworth and Heyndels (2002) provide indirect evidence for Rose’s (1985) 
hypothesis that a change in the tax structure has – in itself and irrespective of the 
direction of the change – a political cost for the incumbent.  They show that OECD 
governments have a tendency not to change tax structures in the year prior to 
elections.  This points to a belief among politicians that changing the tax structure 
lowers their popularity, which – when elections are imminent – could cost them their 
position.  In the present paper, we provide a more direct test of Rose’s (1985) 
hypothesis and assess whether politicians’ apparent reluctance to change the tax 
structure prior to elections is justified.  Specifically, we test the hypothesis that both 
the level of the tax burden and the change in the tax structure affect the incumbent US 
president’s approval ratings using a time series of quarterly data covering the period 
1959-2006.  The prediction is that changes in the tax structure have a political cost 
even if total tax revenues are unaffected (indicating a fixed cost of tax reform).  Our 
results are consistent with this hypothesis.  Hence, politicians’ reluctance to change 
tax structures before elections appears warranted. 
 
The outline of the paper is as follows.  In section 2, we discuss the literature on the 
electoral effects of taxation and bring forward the argument, based on Rose (1985) 
and Rose and Karran (1987), that there may well be a cost to changes in the tax 
structure, irrespective of a change in the tax burden associated with this reform.  In 
section 3, we describe the evolution of the federal tax burden and structure in the 
United States over the period 1959-2006, using data provided by the Bureau of   3
Economic Analysis.  In section 4, we use this information to extend previous work on 
the electoral cost of taxation by regarding both the burden of taxation and changes in 
the structure of tax revenues in a popularity function for the US presidents since 1959.  
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  The electoral cost of taxation 
 
2.1.  A review of the literature 
 
The relation between taxation and incumbent popularity has been the subject of an 
extensive empirical literature.  Three groups of studies can be distinguished 
depending on the indicator of tax policy used: (a) total tax revenues, (b) revenues 
from specific taxes and (c) tax rates, tax liability and new taxes.  Starting with studies 
regarding the political cost of total tax revenues, two early analyses by Pomper (1968) 
and Turrett (1971) cannot uncover a consistent relation between taxation and US 
governor’s election results.  Hansen (1999) corroborates this result using 
gubernatorial popularity ratings.  In contrast, Peltzman (1992), Sobel (1998), Lowry et 
al. (1998) and Kelleher and Wolak (2005) do find some evidence of an electoral cost 
of taxation on US governors.  Empirical analyses at higher levels of government are 
equally ambiguous.  Niskanen (1975; 1979), for example, shows that an increase in 
federal tax revenues significantly depresses the vote for the US presidential candidate 
of the incumbent party (see also Peltzman, 1992; Cuzán and Bundrick, 1999) while 
Pissarides (1980) and Geys and Vermeir (2007) confirm this using data on the 
popularity of the British government and German Chancellor respectively.  Hibbs   4
(2000), however, does not find a significant impact of fiscal variables on US 
presidential elections.  In two more recent studies, Lowry et al. (1998) and Sobel 
(1998) argue that this ambiguity of results may be driven by the fact that the cost of 
taxation depends on the incumbent party.  Republicans are punished for increasing tax 
revenues and rewarded for lowering them, while the opposite is true for Democrats.
1  
 
Recognising the heterogeneity of real-world tax systems and differences in the 
visibility of various taxes, several scholars investigate revenues from specific taxes 
rather than total tax revenues.  Hibbs and Madsen (1981), for example, show that 
decreases in direct income taxation and increases in transfers have a positive influence 
on government popularity (see also Happy, 1992; Cusack, 1999; and, for contrasting 
findings, Peltzman, 1992). More generally, Paldam and Schneider (1980) underscore 
that Danish voters’ response to tax policy differs over various taxes and over time (see 
also Landon and Ryan, 1997; Stults and Winters, 2005; Johnston et al., 2005).   
 
Finally, some authors study the electoral effects of tax policy in a more direct way by 
relying on changes in tax liability for certain income groups, tax rate adjustments or 
introductions of new taxes.
2  Case (1994) and Besley and Case (1995), for example, 
find that an increase in the liability for high-income earners significantly increases the 
probability of a governor not being re-elected.  Eismeier (1979) and Gibson (1994) 
illustrate that the enactment of a new tax has a significant negative impact on 
incumbents (see, however, Kone and Winters, 1993). Related, Eismeier (1979), Kone 
and Winters (1993), Niemi et al. (1995) and MacDonald and Sigelman (1999)  also 
                                                           
1    The significance of these effects depends crucially on the presence of unified or divided 
government.  Republican governors only lose votes when they control both branches of the 
government.  In case of divided government at the state level, no significant effect is found.   5
demonstrate that (more numerous) changes in income and sales tax rates in the US 
affect the incumbent’s popularity rating or vote share. 
 
2.2.  Cost of tax structure changes 
 
As mentioned, several authors have looked at the electoral impact of specific taxes 
rather than the aggregate tax burden.  While this implies that tax structure matters, 
empirical work has thus far failed to explicitly distinguish between the electoral cost 
of an increase in the (overall) tax burden and that arising from a change in the tax 
structure.  This, however, may be overly restrictive.  Indeed, as Rose (1985) and Rose 
and Karran (1987) argue, tax reform may have important fixed costs irrespective of 
whether taxes are increased or lowered.  The possibility of such effects has, however, 
been disregarded in previous empirical work.  Hence, in this paper we look at the 
effect of tax structure changes, controlling for the effect of the total tax burden.   
Indeed, once controlling for the effect of the tax burden, the effect from changes in the 
tax structure are indicative of the fixed cost of changing the tax legislation. 
 
Why would tax structure changes affect voters’ decisions, over and above the effect of 
the tax burden?  Firstly, electoral costs of revenue-neutral changes in tax policies may 
derive from the attention that is drawn to the tax system.  That is, tax changes direct 
media attention to the tax burden voters are facing (Peters, 1991).  As a consequence, 
changes to the tax system may, even if revenue-neutral, be politically unrewarding as 
the public is made more aware of the (possibly high) financial cost of public goods 
provision by the government. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2   Ashworth and Heyndels (2000) investigate the electoral impact of tax policy decisions indirectly by 
analysing politicians’ stated preferences on tax reform, using a survey of Flemish local politicians.   6
 
Secondly, Rose and Karran (1987, 14) observe that “politicians will have to pay the 
costs of defending their proposals to decrease taxes against those who will be hurt by 
the neutralising increase, and those gaining from tax cuts may not provide 
compensating electoral benefits”.  This argument is in line with the observation that 
people generally dislike losses more than they like gains.  In the empirical literature 
on elections, for example, this concept has been called the grievance asymmetry 
(Mueller, 1970; Nannestad and Paldam, 1994) and evidence supporting its existence 
has been found in various settings (e.g. Mueller, 1970; Bloom and Price, 1975; 
Nannestad and Paldam, 1997).  In cognitive psychology, the same characteristic of 
human behaviour is generally referred to as loss aversion (for a discussion and 
empirical findings, see Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; McCaffery and Baron, 2004).  
This loss aversion also drives the specific shape of the value function in ‘prospect 
theory’ as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).  Indeed, an important property 
of their value function is that it is steeper for losses than for gains: an individual’s 
valuation of losses is larger than his valuation of gains of corresponding magnitude.  
With respect to our setting, loss aversion (or grievance asymmetry) implies that even 
revenue-neutral tax reforms (i.e. reforms in which tax structure changes create 
winners and losers, while leaving the overall tax burden unaffected) could have 
significant political costs.   
 
In a recent analysis of political budget cycles, Ashworth and Heyndels (2002) provide 
indirect evidence for the hypothesis that tax structure turbulence has – in itself and 
irrespective of the direction of the change of the overall tax burden – a political cost 
for the incumbent.  Specifically, they consider the year-to-year turbulence in tax   7
structures using OECD data from the period 1965-1995.  The results show that OECD 
governments have a tendency not to change tax structures in the year prior to 
elections.
3  This points to a belief among politicians that changing the tax structure 
impairs their popularity (which could cost them re-election) and provides indirect 
evidence that such behaviour may have political costs.  In the present paper, we 
provide a more direct test of the hypothesis that a change in the tax structure has – in 
itself and irrespective of the direction of the change – a political cost for the 
incumbent, thus assessing whether politicians’ apparent reluctance to change the tax 
structure prior to elections is warranted.
4   
   
 
3.  Evolution of the US tax burden and tax structure 
 
In Figure 1, we present quarterly data on US federal government revenues (as a share 
of GDP).  The data are seasonally adjusted using the US Census X-12 seasonal 
adjustment procedure and run from 1959:1 up to 2006:3.  They are from the National 
Income and Product Accounts Tables (NIPA) provided by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.
5  We use NIPA data because these exist on a quarterly basis (as opposed to 
OECD revenue data) and thus allow us to analyse the impact of tax variables on 
quarterly presidential approval ratings.  The seven lines in the figure display revenues 
                                                           
3   Relatedly, it has been shown that the introduction of new taxes is significantly less likely in election 
years (Mikesell, 1978; Berry, 1988; Berry and Berry, 1992; 1994 and Ashworth et al., 2006). 
4   One might here draw a parallel with the theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty (cfr. 
Dixit, 1989; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Belke and Goecke, 1999; Rose, 2000) to explain inertia in 
government behaviour (and thus limited tax structure turbulence) prior to elections.  That is, 
governments can be seen as investors in fiscal policy (which cannot be reversed without incurring 
additional costs).  The outcome of their fiscal projects is a priori uncertain.  Some of these projects 
are profitable in terms of popularity while others are not. Given this uncertainty, there is an 
incentive for the government to wait with changes in the tax structure (i.e. investing) until the 
uncertainty has resolved (i.e. after the election) (cfr. Dixit, 1989).  Hence, there is an “option value” 
to waiting.  We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us. 
5   The data (NIPA Tables, Table 3.2.) are available from the year 1947, but in their current form they 
start in 1959.   8
from the seven main revenue categories distinguished in the NIPA-tables: personal 
current taxes, excise taxes, customs duties, taxes on Federal Reserve banks, corporate 
income taxes, taxes from the rest of the world (barely visible in Figure 1 due to their 
small revenues as a share of GDP) and contributions for government social insurance.  
These seven categories together make up more than 94% of total revenues in each 






Figure 1 shows that revenues from personal current taxes have been the major source 
of tax revenues over most of the period, hovering around 8% of GDP.  Revenues from 
corporate income taxes and excise taxation have been growing at (much) slower pace 
than GDP over the period, thus generating the downward sloping curve in Figure 1 for 
these two revenue sources.  Social insurance contributions as a share of GDP have on 
the other hand been steadily increasing – though their growth has levelled of since the 
early 1990’s.  The three remaining sources of tax revenues have generated only 
marginal contributions to total tax revenues and have remained relatively stable in 
relation to GDP over the period.  Overall, these various evolutions imply that 
significant shifts have taken place in the US federal tax structure. 
 
Following Hettich and Winer (1984, 1988) the tax structure can be thought of as the 
shares of various taxes in total tax revenues.  For example, in a situation with n taxes, 
the tax structure can be represented as (R1,t, …, Rn,t), where Ri,t is the share of taxi in   9
the total tax revenue in year t (whereby the revenue share of each tax necessarily lies 
between 0 and 1 and tax shares sum to unity over all taxes).  Now, to measure tax 
structure turbulence – or the change in the tax structure over time – we use the index 
proposed by Ashworth and Heyndels (2002).  This index – based on Hymer and 
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The turbulence index,  t R ∆ , takes on values between a minimum of 0 and a maximum 
of 2.  The former is reached when no changes occur in the tax structure from one year 
to the next such that it is perfectly equal at times t and t-1.  The maximum occurs 
when all revenues “shift”, that is, when all taxes raised in period t-1 are non-existent 
in period t and vice versa. 
 
We calculate a tax turbulence index for the US based on the NIPA Tables and using 
the 7 categories of receipts mentioned above (TURB).  Figure 2 depicts the data 
resulting from these calculations.  Though we use quarterly data to calculate the 
turbulence measure used in the analysis later on, in Figure 2 we present the results 
from calculations using yearly data.  This prevents Figure 2 from containing a 
massive amount of data-points (obscuring a clear reading of the graph) and allows for 
comparison with similar data based on the OECD accounts (presented in Ashworth 
and Heyndels, 2002).  The level of tax structure turbulence in a given year is depicted 
on the Y-axis, while time is set on the X-axis.  The dots in Figure 2 represent 






A first thing of note in Figure 2 is that the average value of tax structure turbulence 
lies around 0.044.  This implies that, on average, about 2.2% of total tax revenues is 
“shifted” to other tax instruments between consecutive years.
6  Secondly, though the 
data suggest ample variation in tax structure turbulence over time in the US, year-to-
year fluctuations are mostly of minor size.  Still, two significant peaks are clearly 
visible.  The first occurs the year after the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and 
the second closely follows the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 
of 2001.  Interestingly, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 leads to a much weaker increase 
in tax structure turbulence compared to the previously mentioned major tax reforms.  
Finally, there is a tendency for tax structure turbulence to decrease in presidential 
election years.  Indeed, 7 of the 11 presidential election years in the sample show a 
lower level of tax structure turbulence than the year prior to the election (though only 
three of these represent a local minimum: 1968, 1972 and 2004) while two more have 
a lower level than the year after the election.
7   
 
One important final remark needs to be made with respect to our measure of tax 
structure turbulence.  Although, as mentioned above, our measure indicates higher tax 
                                                           
6   The turbulence measure based on quarterly data has an average value of about 0.023 such that about 
1.15% of revenues is “shifted” on a quarterly basis. 
7   Our data thus allow for a less strong conclusion than those using OECD data.  Indeed, based on 
OECD data from 1965-1995, Ashworth and Heyndels (2002, 351) contend that “turbulence appears 
to be systematically lower in election years”.  The reason for this difference is that tax revenues are 
subdivided in somewhat different categories in the NIPA Tables than by the OECD such that shifts   11
structure turbulence in years with significant changes in the federal tax law (and thus 
picks up the effect of significant policy changes), it is also likely to be influenced by 
changes in economic conditions that affect government revenues levels and structures 
(e.g. growth, inflation and so on).  However, under the assumption that voters 
understand the effect of economic variables on fiscal outcomes “they should penalize 
incumbents only for that part of any tax change which is unanticipated, given 
economic changes” (Besley and Case, 1995, 40).  In that case, effects from economic 
factors should be separated from those of discretionary tax policy changes.   
Obviously, however, this assumption with respect to voters’ understanding of 
economic conditions – and their effects on fiscal outcomes – may not be too credible.  
We return to this issue in the following section. 
 
 
4.  Empirical Analysis  
 
4.1. Empirical  specification 
 
To test whether there is a fixed cost to changing tax policies – irrespective of whether 
the total tax burden is increased or decreased – we estimate a presidential popularity 
function for the US over the period 1959:1-2006:3 including both the level of the tax 
burden and the change in the tax structure.  Specifically, our basic specification is: 
 
 P t = a + bi Pt-i + b3 Xt + b4 DEFt + b5 REVt + b6 TURBt + et   with i = 1, 2 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
between categories in the OECD data may not constitute a shift in the NIPA data, and vice versa.  
As mentioned, we prefer the use of the NIPA data as these allow for an analysis of quarterly data.   12
Where P represents US Presidential Popularity, X is a vector of control variables 
(explained below), DEF refers to the US Federal Government budget deficit (as a % 
of GDP), REV equals the total tax burden (as a % of GDP) and TURB is our measure 
of tax structure turbulence. 
 
In line with Baum and Kernell (2001), the dependent variable of our model (Pt) 
represents a logistic transformation of the US president’s popularity level in quarter t: 
ln(APPt /(100 – APPt)), whereby APP is defined as the average Gallup approval rating 
in that quarter (summary statistics for all variables are provided in Appendix A).  We 
apply this transformation as popularity is bounded between 0 and 100 (and 
transforming the popularity ratings prevents estimated coefficients to lie outside this 
allowable interval). 
 
As explanatory variables, our model first of all includes lags of the dependent variable 
Pt-i (with i = 1, 2).  The number of lags (i.e. two) used in the final model is thereby 
chosen such as to avoid problems of autocorrelation (cfr. Veiga and Veiga, 2004).  
This occurs when two lags of the dependent variable are introduced.
8  Xt is a vector 
comprising a number of standard control variables (more extensively discussed later 
on).  Central to the analysis, however, are three fiscal variables.  DEFt represents the 
budget deficit, measured by the difference between current expenditures and current 
revenues of the US federal government, as a percentage of GDP, in the current 
quarter.  This is included to test the hypothesis that voters are averse to budget deficits 
(Niskanen, 1979; Peltzman, 1992; Kelleher and Wolak, 2005).  As such, we expect b4 
< 0.  REVt is a measure for the total tax burden.  It is operationalised as the sum of 
                                                           
8   When including only one lag of the dependent variable, the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation is 
significantly rejected for all specifications.   13
current tax receipts and contributions for government social insurance, as a percentage 
of GDP.  In line with findings in previous empirical work, we expect a higher tax 
burden to lower the president’s approval ratings such that b5 < 0.  Finally, TURBt 
measures the effect of tax structure turbulence on presidential approval ratings.   
Following the arguments of Rose (1985) and Rose and Karran (1987), we expect this 
index to have a negative effect on popularity, b6 < 0.
9   
 
Our vector of control variables, Xt, contains both economic and political controls.  As 
economic variables, we incorporate the real growth rate of GDP, the inflation rate and 
the unemployment rate in the current quarter.  While the former is expected to lead to 
higher approval ratings, the latter two are expected to lower the president’s popularity.   
 
As political variables, we first include a set of administration dummy variables (as is 
customary in the literature). These assess the existence of any president-specific 
effects on popularity ratings.  Our second political variable assesses the existence of a 
“honeymoon” effect.  This relates to the period of goodwill that a president faces in 
the first quarters of his presidency (Mueller, 1970).  We measure this by including a 
variable that is 3 in the second quarter of each administration, 2 in the third quarter, 1 
in the fourth quarter and 0 in all other quarters (Smyth and Dua, 1989; Fox and 
Phillips, 2003).  Thirdly, we include a dichotomous variable that is 1 in case of 
divided government, 0 otherwise.  In quarters with divided government, it is less clear 
which party should be held responsible for policy, which might benefit the president’s 
                                                           
9   An anonymous referee indicated that popularity may affect contemporaneous economic and fiscal 
variables (i.c. growth, inflation, unemployment, deficit, revenues), leading to a reverse causality 
problem.  However, although the president may react to low popularity ratings by initiating given 
policy measures, this is likely to take some time in leading to observable results in economic 
outcomes.  Hence, the contemporaneous  (causal) effect of popularity on economic and fiscal 
variables is likely to be weak and unproblematic for the interpretation of our results.   14
popularity (Nicholson et al., 2002).   This argument is in line with the “clarity of 
responsibility” hypothesis suggested by Powell and Whitten (1993). 
 
Then, we account for the effects of wars fought by the US army.  We control for the 
effects of the Vietnam War through a variable measuring the number of US military 
casualties in the period 1964-1975.  Earlier studies show that Vietnam represented a 
political cost for the US president (Gronke and Newman, 2003).  Though war-
casualties are bad for presidential popularity, short wars may actually improve his 
position as voters might adhere to the “united we stand, divided we fall” adagio and 
be more supportive towards their president.  This “rally around the flag” effect then 
creates a boost to approval ratings (Mueller, 1970).  The effect of the first Gulf war is 
analysed through a dichotomous variable equal to 1 in the quarters 1990:3-1991:1 and 
0 otherwise (Nickelsburg and Norpoth, 2000).  The second Gulf war is controlled for 
with a dummy that is 1 in the first two quarters of 2003 (official combat was declared 
over by President George W. Bush on May 1st).
10  We also control for the rally effect 
after 9/11.  This rally has been remarkably long and slowly decaying compared to 
previous rallies (Gaines, 2002; Hetherington and Nelson, 2003).  Therefore, instead of 
including a dichotomous variable, we allow for the 9/11 effect by creating a variable 
that is zero in the quarters prior to 2003:3, and 1/i starting from that quarter (with i = 
1, 2, 3, …).  In addition, we allow for the effects of scandals involving the president.  
A dummy to control for the Watergate scandal is 1 in the quarters 1973:2-1974:2, and 
                                                           
10  We also analysed the effect of the number of US killed and wounded in action in the current Iraq 
campaign.  These data were retrieved from www.icasualties.org and are based on official statistics 
from the US Department of Defense.  Interestingly, however, the number of casualties and wounded 
soldiers does not appear to have a statistically significant detrimental effect on President Bush’ 
popularity over the period studied (not reported).  Most likely, this effect is already taken up in the 
9/11 effect.  Indeed, removing the slowly decaying 9/11 variable from the estimations leads to a 
strongly negative impact of Iraq war casualties on approval ratings.   15
zero otherwise.  The effect of the Iran-Contra affair is captured with a dummy equal 
to 1 in the quarters 1986:4-1987:1, and zero otherwise.
11   
 
Finally, (unreported) preliminary analyses showed that both approval ratings and tax 
structure turbulence witness significant seasonal trends when regressing these 
variables on three dummies for the different quarters of the year.  Hence, it is 
important to include such dummy variables also in our final regression equations.  
Failing to do this could lead to spurious regression results (whereby seasonal trends in 
popularity are mistakenly judged to derive from tax structure turbulence).  Hence, 
dummy variables equal to 1 in quarters 1, 2 and 3 (and 0 otherwise) were included in 




As mentioned, we test the model using data on US presidential approval ratings from 
1959:3-2006:3.
12  Still, before we turn to the estimation results, it is important to note 
that unit root tests were performed to assess the stationarity of our variables.  Failing 
to test for this could lead to spurious inferences in time series analyses (Harris, 1995).  
The results of the unit root tests (given in Table 1) indicate that all variables are 
stationary, with the exception of unemployment and inflation.  As first differences of 
                                                           
11   Interestingly, a dummy variable controlling for the (failed) impeachment procedure against 
President Clinton following the Monica Lewinsky affair fails to reach statistical significance and is 
not retained in the final regression model.  This corroborates Zaller’s (1998) finding that this affair 
did not harm Clinton’s popularity. 
12  Two outliers were removed before estimation (i.e. second and third quarter of 1975).  In these 
quarters tax structure turbulence was well above 0.10 whereas the average is only 0.023.  We do not 
have an explanation for these outliers.  We also drop the first observations of each administration, 
as we lack lags of the dependent variable for these quarters.   16








We present two sets of results.  In Table 2, we assume that TURB accurately captures 
tax structure turbulence.  Hence, for the time being, we ignore the fact that part of the 
movement in TURB might derive from changes in economic outcomes and their 
effect on tax revenues (cfr. supra).  We will explore this assumption further later on 
(see Table 3).  Column (1) in Table 2 presents results using simple OLS estimation, 
presented mainly for reasons of comparison.  In the remainder of the table, we instead 
use 2SLS results to account for the fact that tax structure turbulence is likely to be 
endogenous (see Ashworth and Heyndels, 2002).  Given the difficulty to find 
appropriate instruments, we thereby follow two different strategies.  Column (2) 
exploits a set of ‘economic’ instruments which have previously been shown to 
influence tax structure turbulence in OECD countries (Ashworth and Heyndels, 
2002): viz. a dummy variable indicating whether the quarter is in an election year or 
not and the absolute value of the growth rate, the inflation rate and the unemployment 
                                                           
13  We perform augmented Dickey-Fuller regressions where the number of lagged first differences was 
decided by a sequential general to specific rule (Hall, 1994; Maddala and Kim, 2004).  This 
amounts to starting with a large number of lags (kmax) and to iteratively test the significance of the 
largest lag until one finds a significant one.  Specifically, we follow Schwert (1989) to determine 
the starting lag length and set kmax = the integer part of [12 (T/100)
1/4], with T representing the 
number of observations.  Consequently, we use 13 lags as the point of departure (as T=183).  When 
testing for a unit root in the turbulence and approval variables, we included quarterly dummies to 
control for seasonal effects (Enders, 2004).  This was not necessary for the other economic and 
fiscal variables as these are seasonally adjusted data.  Note also that a HEGY test for seasonal unit 
roots rejects the null hypothesis of unit root at zero, semi-annual and annual frequency for the 
approval and turbulence variables (Hylleberg et al., 1990) (results available upon request).   17
rate.  Column (3) employs a set of ‘econometric’ instruments built based on third (and 
higher) moments, as espoused by Dagenais and Dagenais (1997) and Lewbel (1997).
14  
These are by construction highly correlated with the turbulence measure, but are 
uncorrelated with the dependent variable – making them intrinsically useful 
instruments (though, unlike the ‘economic’ instruments, arguably harder to interpret 
substantively).  In each case, we provide the Anderson canonical correlation test and 
the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions to attest the appropriateness of the 






Before discussing the central – fiscal – variables of the model, we should note that all 
three economic control variables perform poorly.  None of them has a significant 
effect on approval ratings.  Growth and the change in unemployment are highly 
correlated.  When leaving out either of them, the effect of the other has the expected 
sign and (at least approaches) statistical significance at conventional levels. The 
political variables also confirm our expectations (and the results of the prior 
literature).  Particularly, we find clear evidence of president-specific effects, a highly 
significant positive honeymoon effect, lower popularity ratings following the 
                                                           
14   These instruments involve demeaning the model’s explanatory variables.  Denoting these demeaned 
variables as x, the instruments used are a constant, z1 = x*x and z4 = x*x*x – 3x[E(x’x/N)*Ik] with 
* designating the Hadamard element by element matrix multiplication operator (see Dagenais and 
Dagenais, 1997, 197-198).  This choice was dictated by the Monte Carlo simulations of Dagenais 
and Dagenais (1997) and involve the same terms as suggested by Lewbel (1997).  Note that in the 
construction of these instruments, we exclude the lagged dependent variables as they are likely to 
be predetermined but not completely exogenous (and, as such, their internal correlation with the 
dependent variable may cause problems).    18
Watergate and Iran-Contra affairs and higher ratings in war-time as well as after 9/11 
(in line with a “rally around the flag” effect; Mueller, 1970).   
 
Turning our attention to the fiscal variables, the results provide support for the 
negative impact of budget deficits on presidential popularity.  This corroborates the 
results of – among others – Niskanen (1979), Peltzman (1992) and Kelleher and 
Wolak (2005) and indicates a desire for sound financial management and an aversion 
to fiscal deficits in the electorate.  Total government revenues as a share of GDP also 
have the expected negative effect on US presidential popularity.  This is in line with 
the findings of Niskanen (1975; 1979), Peltzman (1992) and Cuzán and Bundrick 
(1999).  We should note at this point that a Wald test shows the coefficients for 
revenues and deficit to be statistically distinct (Chi²(1) > 3.80 in all cases, p<0.10).  
This result points out that voters dislike taxes slightly more than deferred taxation 
(through deficit financing).  That is, voters appear not to fully recognize that, given 
the current value of future spending, “a deficit-financed cut in current taxes leads to 
higher future taxes that have the same present value as the initial cut” (Barro, 1989, 
38).  Hence, against the basic tenet of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem (which 
states that a rearrangement of the timing of taxes has no first-order effect on aggregate 
demand, and thereby on economic growth), shifting taxes into the future through 
deficit financing has a small direct positive effect on government popularity.   
 
Importantly, tax structure turbulence has the anticipated negative effect on 
presidential popularity and this effect is statistically significant in the OLS regression 
and when using the various sets of instruments.  This finding thus is robust over all 
specifications.  This supports the contention that shifts in the tax structure impose a   19
political cost for the incumbent, even when these changes are revenue-neutral (cfr. 
Rose, 1985; Rose and Karran, 1987).  As a corollary to this finding, we can conclude 
that politicians’ reduction of tax structure turbulence in election years (see Ashworth 
and Heyndels, 2002) represents a rational response to these costs.
15 
 
Now we know that there is an independent effect of tax structure turbulence, we might 
be interested in assessing the size of the estimated effects of our fiscal variables.  The 
coefficients in Table 2 are, however, not readily interpretable since the dependent 
variable has been transformed (see above).  Still, we can calculate the marginal effects 
on the untransformed dependent variable as: (100 β exp(βx))/(1+exp(βx))², where β is 
the coefficient in Table 2.  As x we take the sample mean of the explanatory variable.  
Using the results in column (3), we find that an increase in revenues (as a percentage 
of GDP) with one percentage point lowers presidential approval with approximately 
0.85 %.  An increase in the deficit with one percentage point lowers approval with 
2.57 %.  Finally, an increase in tax structure turbulence with one standard deviation 
(0.017) decreases approval with around 1.18 % (using the results in Column (3)).  
These effects are clearly non-negligible.
16  
                                                           
15   As the tax structure turbulence index has seven distinct components, it is interesting to see whether 
all components have the same impact on popularity.  Including the revenues from the different 
types of taxation directly into the VP-function, we find that the strongest negative effects of 
taxation on popularity derive from social security contributions and excise tax revenues.  Given that 
the major component of the excise program is motor fuel, this suggests that the US public is very 
sensitive to taxes on its mobility and wage income.  Income and corporate taxation also 
significantly depress presidential popularity.  Interestingly, tax revenues from the ‘rest of the world’ 
have a small positive effect (which is only significant at the 15% significance level). 
16  The model estimated thus far is essentially a short-term model.  To estimate possible long-term 
effects, we included both the difference (to assess short-term effects) and lags (to assess long-term 
effects) of our economic and fiscal variables.  These additional results (available upon request) 
indicate that the long- and short-term effects of growth and inflation are roughly similar in size 
(with growth having a positive and mostly significant effect and inflation an insignificant one).  
Unemployment appears to have a positive short-term effect and a negative long-term effect (though 
both are statistically insignificant).  Both revenues and the deficit have significant negative long-
term effects (while short-term effects are insignificant).  Finally, the effect of tax structure 
turbulence is negative in both short- and long-term perspective, though statistical significance is 
generally stronger for the short-term coefficient.  Hence, tax structure turbulence affects   20
 
Up to this point, we have (implicitly) assumed that our tax structure turbulence 
variable accurately reflects policy initiatives.  However, as mentioned before, 
although TURB indicates higher tax structure turbulence in years with significant 
changes in the federal tax law (and thus picks up the effect of important policy 
changes - see section 3), it is likely to be also influenced by changes in economic 
conditions that affect government revenues (e.g. growth, inflation and so on).  The 
same obviously might also hold for the other two other fiscal variables in the model.  
The results in Table 2 do not allow a clear conclusion as to whether the observed 
effect of tax structure turbulence (nor of the revenues and deficit) on presidential 
popularity is due to the effect of discretionary policy decisions or effects from the 
economy.  Consequently, one might argue that these ‘economic’ effects should be 
separated from those of discretionary tax policy changes.  While this argument has 
some theoretical merit, we feel that it is empirically less satisfactory for two reasons.  
Firstly, it entails the assumption that voters understand the effect of economic 
variables on fiscal outcomes and (are able to) perform regression-based evaluations of 
politicians to distinguish between both effects.  This appears, at best, implausible (for 
a similar argument, see Besley and Case, 1995, 40).  Moreover, voters may simply 
want to punish unfavourable fiscal outcomes independent of their cause (be it the 
economy or tax reform).  
 
Nevertheless, following Besley and Case (1995), we test whether voters do in reality 
make a difference between variations in fiscal outcomes caused by discretionary 
policy decisions from those generated by the economy (a related idea is exploited in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
presidential popularity, but mainly appears to do so in the short-term (which supports the contention 
that it is to be avoided when elections are imminent).  We are grateful to a referee for suggesting   21
Bordignon et al., 2003; Allers and Elhorst, 2005).  Specifically, we estimate three 
auxiliary regressions with our three fiscal variables as the respective dependent 
variables and GDP growth, inflation and unemployment as explanatory variables.
17  
Importantly, the predicted values of these auxiliary regressions are the fiscal outcomes 
as they are anticipated given the economic conditions in that quarter (Besley and 
Case, 1995).  The error terms, however, indicate the effect of discretionary policy 
changes on the three fiscal variables.  These effects may be termed ‘unanticipated’ – 
reflecting that they are not expected given changes in economic conditions.  By 
including both the predicted values and the errors from these auxiliary regressions in a 
model explaining US presidential popularity, we would expect that only the latter lead 
to electoral punishment.  The reason is that (rational) voters should not punish 
incumbents for changes in fiscal outcomes caused by economic forces (as such effects 
would be ‘anticipated’), but should reserve punishment for effects caused by 
discretionary changes in tax policies.  The results are presented in Table 3 (as the 
results for the control variables mirror those in Table 2, we suppress their results here 
for space reasons).  Column (1) presents results for the baseline model (using all 
control variables as presented in Table 2), while columns (2) and (3) report on 
robustness checks in which we excluded unemployment (given its correlation with 




                                                                                                                                                                      
this extension to our model. 
17   In the regression for tax structure turbulence, we use the absolute value of the changes in the three 
explanatory variables (as variations in any direction are likely to have the same effect on tax 
structure turbulence, where this is clearly not the case for fiscal revenue and deficit levels).  Also, in 
all first stage regressions, we include a lagged dependent variable to correct for first-order 
autocorrelation and quarterly dummies to account for seasonal effects.   22
____________________ 
 
The findings in Table 3 look somewhat counter-intuitive at first sight.  Indeed, we 
find that presidential popularity is significantly negatively affected by anticipated 
increases in total tax revenues and deficits, but not by unanticipated increases.  On the 
other hand, approval is significantly negatively affected by unanticipated changes in 
tax structure turbulence, but not by anticipated changes.  Taking these results at face 
value would imply that voters respond to changes in tax revenues and deficit caused 
by the economy only (which are changes they should ‘anticipate’) whereas they only 
react to tax structure turbulence if it is generated by discretionary policy changes.  
Still, F-tests – reported at the bottom of Table 3 – indicate that the difference between 
‘anticipated’ and ‘unanticipated’ effects is statistically significant only for revenues 
(at the 95% confidence level).  Hence, to the limited extent that voters do distinguish 
between these two sources of variation, it does not appear to lead to consistent 
reactions (since they appear to react to ‘anticipated’ revenues and deficits, but to 
‘unanticipated’ turbulence).  Interestingly, while Besley and Case (1995, 40) find that 
voters react to ‘unanticipated’ changes in income tax liabilities (in line with rational 
behavior), they nonetheless remain sceptical as to the “plausibility of assuming that 
voters are doing regression-based evaluations of incumbents in their heads”.  So are 
we.  Hence, the overall inference to be drawn from these results appears to be that 
voters do not effectively distinguish between variations in fiscal outcomes caused by 
the economy or the incumbent’s discretionary policy decisions. 
 
   23
5.  Conclusion 
 
The literature on VP-functions shows that taxation has an important effect on the 
popularity and re-election odds of politicians.  However, these earlier studies on the 
electoral cost of taxation have concentrated on the effect of changes in overall tax 
burden and disregarded potential effects from changes in the tax structure.  Still, as 
argued by Rose (1985) and Rose and Karran (1987), an incumbent’s popularity is 
likely to be maximised, ceteris paribus, under a stable and unchanging tax system.  
The argument builds on the notion that tax changes have (fixed) costs irrespective of 
whether taxes are increased or lowered.  Following this line of argument, in the 
present paper we have tested the impact of both the total tax burden and tax structure 
changes on US presidential popularity. 
 
Our data consist of quarterly approval ratings for the incumbent US president over the 
period 1959-2004.  As a measure for the change in the tax system, we use a tax 
structure turbulence index similar to the one used by Ashworth and Heyndels (2002).  
The results indicate that fiscal policy has an important influence on presidential 
approval ratings.  Specifically, we find that approval ratings suffer from both 
increases in the tax burden and the deficit.  In line with the theoretical predictions by 
Rose (1985) and Rose and Karran (1987), tax structure turbulence has a negative 
effect on presidential approval.  Hence, politicians act rationally in trying to avoid this 
cost of taxation by minimizing tax structure turbulence when elections are imminent 
(as found by Ashworth and Heyndels, 2002).  
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  Personal current taxes     Excise taxes
    Customs duties     Federal Reserve banks
    Corporate income taxes   Taxes from the rest of the world
Contributions for government social insurance
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Table 1: Results from unit-root tests (using Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests) 
Variable #  lags  τµ Inference 
Presidential Approval  0  -4.34***  Stationary 
Presidential Approval (log transformed)  1  -4.41***  Stationary 
TURB 12  -5.72***  Stationary 
Revenues 4  -3.94*  Stationary 
Deficit 2  -2.66*  Stationary 
Growth 11  -4.02***  Stationary 
Unemployment 12  -1.80  Unit  root 
Unemployment, first differences  11  -3.86***  Stationary 
Inflation 12  -0.44  Unit  root 
Inflation, first differences  11  -5.75***  Stationary 
Note:  Critical values τµ, are in Fuller (1976).  We use interpolated critical values 
as provided by Stata.  Seasonal dummies were included for the Approval 
and Turbulence variables. 
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Table 2: Determinants of US Presidential approval ratings 1959-2006 












































Revenues -0.155  *** 
(-3.61) 
-0.158 ***  
(-3.39) 
-0.155 ***  
(-3.61) 


































































































255.58 *** (18) 
43.02 (17) 
Note:   N = 170. Numbers between brackets are t-values. *** significant at 1%; ** at 5% and * at 
10%.  AR(2) tests for second-order autocorrelation and has a standard-normal distribution.  Anderson 
examines the strength of our instruments and Sargan assesses the null hypothesis that our instruments 
are valid. Both follow a Chi² distribution with the number of degrees of freedom given between 
brackets.  The instruments in the 2SLS regressions consist of ‘economic’ variables in Column (2) and 
are based on Dagenais and Dagenais (1997) in Column (3).   34
Table 3: Effects of ‘anticipated’ and ‘unanticipated’ fiscal outcomes 




















































































Note:  N = 170. Numbers between brackets are t-values. *** significant at 1%; ** at 
5% and * at 10%.  AR(2) tests for second-order autocorrelation and has a 
standard-normal distribution.  A full set of controls – as in table 2 – were 
included in column (1), while in columns (2) and (3) we checked whether the 
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Appendix A: Summary statistics  
 














(untransformed)  54.25 11.54 25.86 87.13 
Growth 3.47  3.49  -7.8  16.7 
Inflation 4.02  2.79  0.39  14.43 
Unemployment 5.84  1.42  3.4  10.67 
Revenues 17.95  0.89  16.15  20.64 
Deficit 1.26  2.12  -3.04  5.47 
TURB  0.023 0.017 0.003 0.092 
Honeymoon 0.19  0.608 0  4 
Divided Government  0.63  0.48  0  1 
Watergate 0.03  0.17  0  1 
Iran-Contra 0.01  0.11 0  1 
Vietnam 291.84  853.92  0 5447 
Gulf I  0.01  0.08  0  1 
September 11  0.02  0.09  0  1 
Gulf II  0.01  0.11  0  1 
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Appendix B: Data description 
 








Average of GALLUP ratings in quarter (interpolated 





Growth  Percent change from preceding period in real Gross 
Domestic Product, seasonally adjusted at annual rates. 
National Income and Product Accounts 
Tables, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Unemployment  Unemployment rate, in percentage, average over quarter, 
seasonally adjusted.  US Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Inflation  Percentage change in CPI (average over quarter, 
seasonally adjusted at annual rates).  CPI from US Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Revenues 
Sum of Current tax receipts and Contributions for 
government social insurance (billions of dollars, 
seasonally adjusted at annual rates), as percentage of 
Gross Domestic Product (billions of dollars, seasonally 
adjusted at annual rates).  
Own calculations based on data from National 
Income and Product Accounts Tables, Table 
3.2., Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Deficit 
 Minus Net Federal Government saving (billions of 
dollars, seasonally adjusted at annual rates), as 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (billions of 
dollars, seasonally adjusted at annual rates).  
Own calculations based on data from National 
Income and Product Accounts Tables, Table 
3.2., Bureau of Economic Analysis 
TURB See  text. 
Own calculations based on data from National 
Income and Product Accounts Tables, Table 
3.2., Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Honeymoon  Value 3 in second quarter of a presidency, 2 in third 
quarter, 1 in fourth quarter, 0 in all other quarters.   
Divided Government 
Dichotomous variable coded 1 when majority party in 
House or Senate is different from party of the incumbent 
president, 0 otherwise. 
www.house.gov; www.senate.gov; 
www.whitehouse.gov 
Watergate  Dichotomous variable coded 1 in quarters 1973:2-
1974:2, 0 otherwise.   
Iran-Contra  Dichotomous variable coded 1 in quarters 1986:4-
1987:1, 0 otherwise.   
Vietnam 
Number of casualties in quarter (Military personnel who 
died, were missing in action or prisoners of war as a 
result of the Vietnam conflict). 
 
Records of the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense;  Series: Combat Area Casualties 
Database 
Gulf I  Dichotomous variable coded 1 in quarters 1990:3-
1991:1, 0 otherwise.   
September 11  Variable is 1 in 2001:3, and 1/i thereafter  
(with i = 2, 3, …).   
Gulf II  Dichotomous variable coded 1 in quarters 2003:1-
2003:2, 0 otherwise.   
 
 